“The absence of goals is contrary to leading practices we identified in our prior work, which call for program goals to clearly define desired program outcomes,” GAO said. Key among its findings was the fact that Cyber Command has not defined goals for the JCWA that would describe how current and future systems would interoperate. GAO’s audit relied on interviews with officials and unclassified materials, and it took place from October 2019 to November 2020. The GAO noted that the Department of Defense created this architecture to harmonize cyber capabilities, though command officials explained to GAO auditors that JCWA is merely a loose architecture to provide an idea to bring acquisitions together and steer requirements and investment decisions. But the command is building out its own standalone military cyber systems separate from the intelligence platforms used by the NSA for intelligence-gathering purposes, which is distinct from military goals. JCWA was broken up into five elements: common firing platforms for a comprehensive suite of cyber tools Unified Platform that will integrate and analyze data from offensive and defensive operations with partners joint command-and-control mechanisms for situational awareness and battle management sensors that support defense of the network and drive operational decisions and the Persistent Cyber Training Environment, which will provide individual and collective training as well as mission rehearsal.Ĭyber Command was granted limited acquisition authority but still relies on the armed services to act as executive agents for major programs, meaning many major acquisition efforts for systems within the JCWA spread across services to provide for the joint cyber mission force.Ĭyber Command has been heavily reliant on the tools, personnel and infrastructure of the National Security Agency, and the two organizations are co-located.
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